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  N
ow that the media frenzy 
over West Nile virus (WNV) 
has subsided, and pictures of 
dead birds and insect repellant cans 
no longer permeate the nightly news, 
what shall we do about screening the 
United States blood supply for the 
virus? Shortly after the spread of WNV 
in North America and the revelation 
that blood transfusions may transmit 
the virus [1], US ofﬁ  cials established 
regulations requiring blood banks 
to screen all their donated blood for 
WNV using nucleic acid ampliﬁ  cation 
tests. Although these requirements 
have been in place since June 2003, 
there has been debate over if and how 
to continue the screening [2,3]. The 
threat of disease certainly still exists, 
but with limited resources and other 
potential hazards to blood supply 
safety, there has been a real need for 
good, objective economic studies to 
determine what type and what degree 
of screening should be performed.
  Two New Cost-Effectiveness Studies
    Two recent cost-effectiveness studies 
address this question, one by Korves 
and colleagues [4] published in   PLoS 
Medicine   (summarized in Box 1) and 
another by Custer and colleagues [5] 
published in a recent issue of   Annals 
of Internal Medicine   (summarized in 
Box 2). Discussing mass infectious 
disease screening measures without 
considering economic consequences 
is like eating at a smorgasbord without 
considering calories and fat. While in 
the short term, “indulging” in a certain 
screening measure may be necessary 
to avert a disease outbreak, in the 
long term, public health ofﬁ  cials must 
decide if it is worth continuing to invest 
precious resources that may be better 
utilized in other areas.  
    Because study assumptions and 
methodological approaches can vary, 
a series of studies may be needed to 
move toward an appropriate policy. Both 
Korves’s study and Custer’s study arrive 
at similar general conclusions: the cost-
effectiveness of individual donor 
screening depends on WNV prevalence, 
and targeted donor screening appears to 
be more cost-effective than mass donor 
screening. The two studies differ, however, 
in some of the questions that they address 
and in the answers that they provide. 
      Who gets the blood may be as 
important as who gives the blood.   
While Custer’s study focused on the 
blood donors, Korves’s study also 
evaluated strategies that considered 
the recipient’s immune status, ﬁ  nding 
that even when the prevalence of the 
virus is low, screening blood supplies 
destined for immunocompromised 
recipients may be cost-saving. The 
dangers and consequences of even a 
few immunocompromised patients 
contracting WNV by transfusion appear 
to signiﬁ  cantly outweigh the low 
incidence of transmission.  
      The question may be not only 
whether to pool but how much to 
pool.   While both studies compared 
individual donated blood sample 
testing with minipool testing, Korves’s 
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    Korves and colleagues constructed 
a Markov model simulating patients 
receiving blood transfusions under nine 
different screening strategies: (1) only 
administering a donor questionnaire, 
(2) year-round testing of 16-sample 
minipools (for a deﬁ  nition of minipool 
testing, see section entitled The Question 
May Be Not Only Whether to Pool, but 
How Much to Pool ), (3) seasonal (i.e., May 
through November) testing of 16-sample 
minipools, (4) year-round testing of six-
sample minipools, (5) seasonal testing 
of six-sample minipools, (6) year-round 
individual donor testing, (7) seasonal 
individual donor testing, (8) year-round 
individual testing of donations designated 
for immunocompromised recipients, and 
(9) seasonal individual testing of donations 
designated for immunocompromised 
recipients. They assumed that test-kit 
cost per sample would be US$3 for 
individual testing, US$0.50 for six-sample 
minipool testing, and US$0.19 for 16-
sample minipool testing; determined 
a US$19 laboratory technician hourly 
rate; added additional testing costs 
such as the costs of discarded samples 
(US$90) and donor notiﬁ  cation (US$500); 
and abstracted disease costs from the 
literature. They found that in high WNV 
prevalence areas, seasonal individual 
donation screening of blood designated 
for immunocompromised recipients 
would be most cost-effective and, in fact, 
cost saving, whereas in areas with low 
prevalence, using a donor questionnaire 
alone would be most cost-effective. 
  Box 1. Korves and Colleagues’ 2006 Study
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study took the extra step of looking at 
minipools of 16 samples and minipools 
of six samples separately. In the 
minipool testing method, a number 
of individual samples are combined 
in a pool, and the pool of samples is 
tested. When the pool tests negative, 
one assumes that each individual 
sample that contributed to the pool is 
negative. When the pool tests positive, 
one tests the individual donations to 
ﬁ  nd the positive(s). The advantage of 
the minipool method is that it reduces 
the number of tests that have to be 
run, presumably reducing costs and 
saving time. The major drawback of this 
“pooling” method is that testing may 
not be able to detect low levels of virus 
that are further diluted when blood 
samples are combined. Therefore, 
pooling six samples together is not 
the same as pooling 16 samples; for a 
given number of donations, pools of 
size 16 require fewer tests, but each 
test may be less sensitive because of 
dilution. Although Korves’s study did 
not ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant differences in the 
cost-effectiveness of these two types of 
pooling, the balances in efﬁ  ciencies 
and costs between virus detection assays 
and the mechanics of testing may, in 
the future, favor larger pools.
      Consider all of the steps involved in 
a screening operation.   In determining 
the costs of screening, Korves’s 
study captured aspects of the testing 
procedure—such as discarding false 
positives, notifying donors, and 
retrieving test results—which were 
overlooked by Custer’s study. Screening 
can be a complicated operation 
and seemingly minor steps can 
inﬂ  ate overall costs (especially when 
disproportionate time and labor are 
involved), or they can be bottlenecks. 
A cost-effectiveness study may suggest 
such targets for cost reduction.
      Seasonal screening is potentially very 
different from year-round screening.   
Korves’s study assumed that the cost 
per sample screened would remain 
relatively constant between seasonal 
and year-round approaches. In reality, 
in seasonal screening, there are 
start-up costs at the beginning of the 
screening season (e.g., appropriate 
reagents have to be produced and put 
in place) and stoppage costs at the 
end of the screening season (e.g., the 
reagents have to be removed from 
the production and screening lines 
and disassembled), some of which 
were accounted for in Custer’s study. 
Additionally, in seasonal screening, 
personnel and operations may not be 
as efﬁ  cient as in year-round screening 
(e.g., it may take a while for things to 
get up to speed, and it may be tougher 
to ﬁ  nd seasonal employees than year-
round employees). 
      When estimating the impact of 
disease, do not overlook potential 
productivity losses.   In tabulating the 
cost of disease, Custer and colleagues 
included work productivity losses not 
considered by Korves and colleagues. 
Productivity losses from patients missing 
work or no longer able to work because 
of disability and death are always an 
important component of disease costs 
[6,7]. This is especially true with a viral 
illness such as WNV, where the acute 
illness is often overshadowed by malaise 
and fatigue that may impair a person’s 
ability to work. 
  Conclusion
    In the end, there are few perfect 
economic studies, and one should 
neither require nor expect perfection. 
Instead, the measure of an economic 
study is in not only the answers it 
provides but also the questions it raises. 
In this way, both Korves’s article and 
Custer’s article succeed. In addition to 
providing some answers (e.g., prevalence 
is related to cost-effectiveness, 
targeted screening may be more cost-
effective, and blood designated for 
the immunocompromised should 
be screened), they raised different 
important questions (e.g., what are 
the true costs of seasonal and year-
round screening? and what are the full 
economic effects of WNV?) and offered 
some essential direction for additional 
lines of inquiry. These studies indicate 
that the optimal cost-effectiveness 
strategy for WNV screening indeed 
depends on the situation, and public 
health ofﬁ  cials can use their results in 
broader evaluations of WNV screening 
strategies.   
  Box 2. Custer and Colleagues’ 
2005 Study
    Custer and colleagues also constructed 
a Markov cohort model simulating 
patients receiving transfusions under 
seven different blood screening 
strategies: (1) no screening, (2) minipool 
testing throughout the US for half of the 
year, (3) minipool testing throughout 
the US over the entire year, (4) individual 
donor testing for one-third of the year 
in the quarter of the US with the highest 
prevalence of WNV, and minipool testing 
for the rest of the country and for the 
remaining two-thirds of the year, (5) 
individual donor testing for the entire 
year in the quarter of the US with the 
highest prevalence of WNV, and minipool 
testing for the rest of the country, (6) 
individual donor testing for one-third of 
the year, with minipool testing for the 
remainder of the year, and (7) national 
individual donor testing over the entire 
year. Using vendor reagent prices, they 
assumed that each minipool test would 
cost US$7 plus US$3 for labor and other 
related costs, each individual donation 
test would cost US$14 plus US$5 for 
labor and other related costs, and partial-
year minipool testing and transitioning 
between minipool and individual 
donation testing would result in some 
additional laboratory preparation costs. 
Disease costs came from an economic 
study of the 2002 Louisiana WNV 
outbreak [8] and published productivity 
loss tables [9]. The most cost-effective 
strategy was annual, national minipool 
testing (US$483,000 per quality-adjusted 
life-year saved), and sensitivity analyses 
showed that the cost-effectiveness 
depended most heavily on WNV virus 
prevalence and testing costs.  
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